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Seventh Circuit Holds ERISA Venue Selection Provision is Enforceable

On August 10, 2017, in In re Mathias, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held ERISA Section 502(e)(2) venue provisions do not invalidate a forum-selection clause contained in plan documents, in a 2-1 split decision.

Case Background

George Mathias sued his employer Caterpillar and its ERISA-governed health plan in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where he resided. The plan documents, however, required any suit to be brought in federal court in the Central District of Illinois, so Caterpillar moved to transfer the case.  Mathias opposed the motion, arguing that ERISA’s venue provision invalidated the plan’s forum-selection clause.  His argument was rejected and Caterpillar’s motion to transfer the case was granted in a decision relying on a Sixth Circuit decision in Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, which held that forum-selection clauses in ERISA plans are enforceable and not inconsistent with the text of ERISA’s venue provision.  When the case arrived in the Central District of Illinois, Mathias moved to transfer it back to Pennsylvania with the same argument, and his request was denied. Then, Mathias petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Seventh Circuit Decision

In a mandamus proceeding, the court can only reverse a transfer decision if the applicant can show that the transfer order is a “violation of a clear and indisputable legal right, or at the very least, is patently erroneous.” In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,

Fourth Circuit: Plan Administrator Must Obtain “Readily Available Information” in Claims Determination

What is a plan administrator’s obligation under ERISA to seek and obtain information potentially relevant to a participant claim where the participant has not provided it? The Fourth Circuit recently provided guidance on that issue in the case of Harrison v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. A copy of that opinion is available here.

Nancy Harrison was an online customer service representative for Wells Fargo Bank. In 2011, she underwent a thyroidectomy to remove a large mass that had extended into her chest and which caused chest pain and tracheal compression. She was unable to work and received short-term disability benefits under the Wells Fargo plan. While she was recovering and waiting for a second, more invasive surgery, her husband died unexpectedly, triggering a recurrence of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the death of her children in a house fire a few years before.

Approximately three weeks after Ms. Harrison’s first surgery, Wells Fargo determined that she had recovered and it discontinued her short-term disability benefits. (It later provided short-term disability benefits after Ms. Harrison’s second surgery.) Ms. Harrison submitted a claim for reinstatement of the short-term disability benefits due to her depression, PTSD and related physical ailments. The outside claims administrator denied that claim. Ms. Harrison submitted an administrative appeal to Wells Fargo, supported by documentation from two of her physicians and a detailed letter from a relative who was her primary caretaker. She also disclosed that she was under the care of

Supreme Court Upholds Enforceability of Plan Limitations Period

On December 16th, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co. – a case involving the tension between: (i) the contractual limitations period in Wal-Mart’s group long-term disability policy, and (ii) the requirement that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit for benefits under ERISA.  In an unanimous decision, the Court yet again favored the interests of enforcement of reasonable plan terms over competing policy interests.  A copy of Heimeshoff opinion is available here.

The Facts in Brief.  Ms. Heimeshoff submitted a claim under Wal-Mart’s long-term disability plan, claiming that she suffered from “extreme pain, significant pain, and difficulty in concentration.”  Hartford Life & Accident Insurance, the plan’s claims administrator, denied the claim.  Heimeshoff administratively appealed the claim denial, and Hartford issued its final claim denial on November 26, 2007.  Just shy of three years later, on November 18, 2010, Heimeshoff filed suit claiming benefits under ERISA.

Hartford argued that Heimeshoff’s claim was barred by the three-year limitations period prescribed in Wal-Mart’s LTD plan, which, under its terms, commenced at the “time written proof of loss” is required to be submitted.  (The latest time for Heimeshoff to submit her proof of loss was in September 2007, in conjunction her administrative appeal.)  Heimeshoff argued that commencing the limitations period at the time written proof is loss must be furnished denied her the full benefit of the three-year limitations period, and that enforcing such a provision could require some claimants to

11th Circuit: Claimant’s Attorney’s Protest Letter Doesn’t Constitute Administrative Appeal for Exhaustion Purposes

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that provides guidance on what constitutes an appeal for purposes of exhausting administrative remedies under ERISA § 503.  In Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v. Total Plastics, Inc. (Nov. 6, 2012), the Court held that a participant’s written protest to the signing of a subrogation agreement did not constitute an administrative appeal of the plan administrator’s claim denial.  To read a copy of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, click here.

The case involves tragic facts.  Kristy Schwade’s infant son started to exhibit symptoms of “shaken baby syndrome” when he was five months old.  The cause of the condition was ultimately traced to a daycare provider, who later pled guilty to aggravated child abuse.  Doctors determined that the child had incurred catastrophic and permanent brain damage, which required hospitalization and continuous medical treatment.  The child later died at age four.

For the first two months after the child’s injury, his medical expenses were paid by the ERISA medical benefits plan sponsored by Schwade’s employer, Total Plastics, Inc.  Thereafter, the plan administrator sent Schwade a letter explaining that it could not process her claim for benefits unless she signed and returned a subrogation agreement.  The administrator’s request was consistent with the subrogation provision in the SPD, which expressly provided that: (i) “if requested,” a participant must “execute documents . . . and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to protect the Plan’s rights;” and (ii) the

Fourth Circuit Latest To Hold That Remand to Plan Administrator Is Not Immediately Appealable

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined five other judicial circuits in ruling that a district court’s remand of a benefits claim to the plan administrator is not immediately appealable. A copy of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012) can be viewed by clicking here. The ruling comes on the heels on a similar ruling by the Eleventh Circuit in Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 671 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012), which we summarized earlier.

In Dickens, the plaintiff applied for long-term disability benefits after being diagnosed with clinical depression, anxiety, insomnia, among other conditions. A predecessor plan administrator granted the LTD benefits in 2004. Four years later, the successor plan administrator, Aetna, terminated the benefits on the grounds that the plaintiff no longer suffered from a debilitating illness. (The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), which had previously determined the plaintiff to be disabled, continued to pay disability benefits.) After exhausting his administrative appeals, the plaintiff sued to have his LTD benefits restored. The district court ruled that Aetna’s decision to terminate the LTD benefits was “arbitrary and unreasonable” because it failed to consider relevant evidence relating to the SSA’s award of disability benefits. The district court expressed no opinion as to whether the plaintiff was disabled under the definition in the LTD plan, and it never issued a final judgment. Aetna filed a direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

District Court’s Remand To Plan Administrator Is Not Final And Appealable

April 23, 2012


The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that a district court’s remand of a benefits claim to the plan administrator is not appealable to the circuit court. For a copy of the court’s opinion in Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 2012 WL 538955 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012), click here.

The plaintiff in Young submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits, which was denied by Prudential. After she exhausted her administrative appeals, the plaintiff sued for benefits. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court found in favor of the plaintiff and remanded the case to Prudential for reconsideration of whether the plaintiff was disabled. The district court clerk then entered what purported to be a final judgment and closed the case. Prudential initiated an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, and while that appeal was pending, Prudential (in its capacity as plan administrator) determined that the plaintiff was disabled.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction because the district court’s remand was not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The remand did not end the case, the Eleventh Circuit noted, because it left unresolved whether the plaintiff was entitled to disability benefits. The district court therefore retains jurisdiction over the matter until a final decision on that issue is made.

This ruling on the limits of appellate jurisdiction over remand orders is in accord with similar decisions from the First, Eighth and

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